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On appeal from an Order by the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, The Honorable Leslie J. Lewis presiding, styled "Proposed Order in 
Conformance with the Memoranda Decision Dated August 16, 2003 [sic]", entered 
December 8, 2004 (Attachment 1), which Order dismissed with prejudice the second, 
third, and fourth claims for relief of Plaintiff s Complaint herein.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff and Appellant Lorin Blauer, a licensed attorney and Utah State career 
service employee since 1981, was the subject of a "corrective action" on September 9, 
2003, in the form of a de facto demotion from his prior position, Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III, for Defendant Department of Workforce Services, to Administrative Law 
Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate. He was afforded no pre-demotion hearing. When Plaintiff 
challenged the demotion through the career service employee grievance procedure 
provided by law, he was met with the declaration, first by Defendant/Appellee 
Department of Workforce Services ("DWS") and then by the Career Service Review 
Board ("CSRB"), that he had no valid complaint as he had not been "demoted" at all as a 
result of the "corrective action", but merely "reassigned." CSRB refused jurisdiction to 
1
 The December 8, 2004, Order remanded Plaintiffs remaining claims (dealing 
with personnel rule violations) to the Career Service Review Board for further 
proceedings, finding that the Career Service Review Board had improperly declined 
jurisdiction thereof. No appeal is taken from this portion of the Court's ruling. 
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hear the matter, declaring that no rule had been violated and plaintiff/appellate had not 
been demoted or suffered any other harm. 
In considering Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (together with a blizzard 
of motions filed by Defendant/Appellee Department of Workforce Services), the lower 
court - ignoring completely established case precedent - concluded that, because Plaintiff 
did not receive a pay cut or lose benefits, his "reassignment", even where taken as 
"corrective action" was, as a matter of law, not a "demotion" at all: 
. . . [T]he court carefully considered the Plaintiffs argument that the court 
look to such factors as the change in his status and that his new 
responsibilities essentially fit the job description for the lower paying and 
apparently less esteemed position of Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris 
Doctorate. While the Plaintiff argues this position admirably, the fact 
remains that without a commensurate decrease in salary or a lower salary 
range (or the loss of retirement benefits), the Plaintiff cannot be considered 
demoted.2 
This Court's decision in Draughon v. Dep't. of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 
935 (Utah App. 1999), as well as other case law and the current wording of administrative 
rules promulgated by the Department of Human Resource Management and DWS itself, 
simply preclude the trial court's categorical presumption that, absent loss of pay or 
benefits, no demotion occurred. Mr. Blauer is entitled to a hearing before the Career 
Service Review Board establishing that he was, in fact, "demoted" - and demoted without 
2
 Trial Court's Memorandum Decision of August 16, 2004 (Attachment 2), at p. 3 
(emphasis added). 
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cause - in violation of due process rights secured by both state and federal constitutional 
guarantees. 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie J. Lewis presiding. By 
her order (Attachment 1), the trial court granted in part, and denied in part, 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, remanding all grievances unrelated 
to his claims of demotion for further hearing before the Career Services Review Board, 
but holding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff could claim no deprivation of any due 
process rights in his employment as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to DWS, as his 
property rights in that employment had not been impacted by a "demotion." 
Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FULL REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff was not 
"demoted" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l), when the Department 
of Workforce Services removed his responsibilities as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III 
(with the required qualifications of Juris Doctorate degree and membership in the Utah 
Bar, and the pay range of step 63-78), and assigned him to perform, full-time, the duties 
of an Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate (which does not require a Juris 
Doctorate degree or membership in the Utah State Bar, has less opportunity for 
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advancement, and is a pay range of step 51-66), even if no immediate change in pay was 
entailed. (Preserved at R. 367-487; 1005-1048.) 
2. Whether the lower court erred in finding that Plaintiffs transfer, as 
described above, was not a "demotion" despite Utah Admin. Code R477-l-l(32), which 
defines demotion as: 
An action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary range or the 
movement of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or 
position having a lower salary range, which may include a reduction in 
salary... 
(Preserved at R. 367-487; 1005-1048.) 
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the demotion issue as described above, and finding that, as a matter of law, 
Mr. Blauer's transfer was not a demotion. (Preserved at R. 367-487; 1005-1048.) 
The lower court's ruling was on motion for summary judgment, and is reviewable 
by this Court for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's actions. See 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. All factual 
inferences are construed in favor of the appellant, and against the appellee. See 
BlueCross & BlueShield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
FEDERAL CASES 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) 
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) 
Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793 
STATE CASES 
Draughon v. Department of Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935 
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm 'n, 949 P.2d 746 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-8 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-12 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-402 through 408 
Utah Admin. Code R477-1-1 
Utah Admin. Code R477-3-3 
678725v2 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Lorin Blauer's claims in this action center around his 
September 9, 2003, demotion from Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to the equivalent of an 
Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate, without cause (and, in fact, as a 
corrective or disciplinary action, and in apparent retaliation for having successfully 
challenged an unfavorable performance review). 
Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning his demotion with DWS' Executive Director 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-19a-302. By letter dated October 14, 2003, and without 
hearing on the issue of whether DWS had cause to demote Plaintiff, DWS upheld 
Plaintiffs demotion by his supervisor, contending that the action was simply a 
reassignment because, "You retain your title as legal counsel and you maintain the same 
pay and pay range. It is not a demotion." 
Plaintiff thereafter appealed DWS' decision to the CSRB, whose administrator 
declined jurisdiction on November 12, 2003, claiming that Plaintiff raised no grievance 
reviewable by CSRB under existing law. 
On December 2, 2003, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of CSRB's declination 
of jurisdiction. By order dated December 22, 2003, CSRB's administrator denied 
Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, and again refused to permit CSRB to hear 
Plaintiffs grievance. 
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Plaintiff filed this action before the lower court on January 6, 2004, and moved for 
summary judgment on March 22, 2004. On April 19, 2004, Defendant/Appellee (which 
had already filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 6, 2004, and received no ruling 
thereon) filed a Cross-motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-motion for Summary Judgment; an Affidavit 
of Chuck Butler in Support of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; an Affidavit of Patricia Barrett in Support of 
Cross-motion for Summary Judgment; an Affidavit of Kevin Beutler in Support of Cross-
motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment; an Affidavit of JoAnne Campbell in support of Defendant's Cross-motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; an 
Affidavit of Tani Downing in Support of Defendant's Cross-motion for Summary 
Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; an Affidavit of 
Thomas E. Patterson in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment; a Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance; a Memorandum and Affidavit 
in Support of Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance; a Rule 16(b) Motion for Schedule and 
Management Conference; and a Memorandum in Support of Rule 16(b) Motion for 
Scheduling and Management Conference. 
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Pending motions were argued to the court on June 24, 2004. By Memorandum 
Decision dated August 16, 2004, the lower court denied DWS' Motion to Dismiss; 
granted in part and denied in part DWS' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, denied in 
part and granted in part Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and implicitly denied 
DWS' remaining motions. Specifically, the lower court held that, as a matter of law, 
Plaintiff was not "demoted" under applicable law, as he suffered no loss of pay or 
benefits. It is from the lower court's determination, in granting DWS' Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment as it relates to Plaintiffs having been demoted, that Plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff began employment with DWS in December of 1980, as a 
temporary, part-time employee. (Affidavit of Lorin Blauer, hereafter "Blauer Affidavit," 
R. 406-487, at f 6). 
2. Effective September 14, 1981, Plaintiff achieved full-time merit status as a 
"Career Service Employee," with a working title of "Legal Counsel." (Blauer Affidavit, 
R. 406-487, K 7.) 
3. As Legal Counsel for DWS, Plaintiffs tasks included advising the 
Workforce Appeals Board (formerly Board of Review), writing its decisions and 
defending those decisions in the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court. 
(Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, % 8.) 
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4. Plaintiff has at all times been effective and productive in his role as Legal 
Counsel for DWS, achieving a seventy-five percent (75%) success rate in reported 
decisions from all matters handled before the Utah Supreme Court or this Court - the 
highest success rate of any DWS Legal Counsel. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, % 9.) 
5. Utah's Division of Human Resource Management, or DHRM, which has 
the responsibility to "prepare, maintain, and revise a position classification plan for each 
employee position" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12, a responsibility which it 
"may not contract or otherwise delegate . . . to another agency (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-8), issued "job descriptions" for a "job series" with titles of Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel I, II, HI, and IV, which are benchmarked to Legal/Enforcement Counsel II. 
These positions require a Juris Doctorate degree and active membership in the Utah State 
Bar Association. The salary range for this series is 55-70 for Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel I; 59-74 for Legal/Enforcement Counsel II; 63-78 for Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III; and 65-82 for Legal/Enforcement Counsel IV. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-
487, f 11 and Exhibit 1.) 
6. As holder of the title of "Legal/Enforcement Counsel III", and as an 
employee performing the functions of that position, Plaintiff was called upon to "provide 
legal advice to agency management, personnel, the Work Force Appeals Board, agency 
executive directors, the Commissioner on Decisions of Administrative Law Judges, 
and/or the entire agency," and to act "as Chief Liaison between their agencies and the 
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Attorney General's Office"; further, Plaintiff was to "functionally or directly supervise 
legal counsel, legal support staff, investigators, and/or auditors" (State of Utah 
Department of Human Resource Management job description, Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III, Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at Exhibit 1, pp.5-6, R. 420-421). 
7. As Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, Plaintiff was to have knowledge 
concerning "applicable laws, rules, regulations and/or policies and procedures . . . agency 
and/or organizational program(s). . . rules of evidence . . . research methods, techniques, 
and/or sources of information . . . [and] civil and criminal justice laws." (Id.) 
8. DHRM has also issued a job description with a title of "Administrative Law 
Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate," which is benchmarked to Rehabilitation Counselor II. The 
job description does not require a Juris Doctorate degree, or membership in the Utah State 
Bar, and has a salary step range of only 51-66, and a pay range of $18.09 - $27.18 per 
hour (State of Utah Department of Human Resource Management job description, 
Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate, Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at 
Exhibit 2, R. 425-426). 
9. The job description for "Administrative Law Judge - Non-Juris Doctorate" 
requires the holders of such position to "preside at hearings consistent with provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governing adjudicative proceedings," to 
"conduct hearings and render decisions based on federal and state laws"; to "utilize 
independent judgment to rule on all issues by evaluating evidence and testimony"; to 
678725v2 10 
"issue written decisions consistent with all applicable laws and rules, conduct pre-hearing 
conferences to negotiate issues and rule on stipulations and motions regarding discovery 
and requests for continuances," to "rule on requests for and issue subpoenas," and to 
"provide training to department employees and external customers as requested." (Id.) 
10. The knowledge and training required of an Administrative Law Judge -
Non Juris Doctorate are limited to "applicable laws, rules, regulations and/or policies and 
procedures . . . legal processes and procedures . . . formats for a wide variety of legal 
documents . . . [and] grammar, spelling and punctuation." (Id.) 
11. Prior to September 9, 2003, Plaintiffs title was Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III; his salary was at step 76 - ten steps above the highest step for Administrative 
Law Judge - DWS. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, ^ 13.) 
12. In addition to his responsibilities as Legal/Enforcement Counsel to DWS, 
Plaintiff performed, as part of his duties specified under his Position Description 
Questionnaire (or "PDQ"), additional work in connection with "special assignments." 
These additional temporary responsibilities included, on occasion, filling in temporarily 
as Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris Doctorate. These kinds of undefined temporary 
additional responsibilities, though, accounted for less than ten percent (10%) of Plaintiff s 
overall workload, according to his official job description. His last PDQ, signed by 
Plaintiff and his then supervisor, Virginia Smith, on April 2 & 3, 1998, lists his duties 
with the Workforce Appeals Board as fifty percent (50%) of his legal duties. Other than 
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for the specific period of his temporary assignment as an Appeal Referee (now 
Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris Doctorate) in 1987, none of Plaintiff s PDQ's 
included serving as, or performing the duties of, an Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris 
Doctorate as part of his duties. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, % 14 and Exhibit 3.) 
13. Historically, Plaintiff shared the responsibility of being Legal Counsel to 
the Workforce Appeals Board of DWS with one or two other attorneys, and the caseload 
remained fairly consistent for many years. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, f 15.) 
14. Beginning in 1998, however, there was a significant increase in caseload -
from 342 in 1998 to 445 in 1999, 485 in 2000, 585 in 2001, and 819 in 2002. There were 
971 Board cases during fiscal year ending June 30, 2003. Plaintiffs share of that 
caseload was 222 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2002, and 443 for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 2003. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, f 16 and Exhibits 4 and 5.) 
15. According to the Affidavit of Tani Downing, DWS' Director of Legal 
Services/Appeals (R. 727-840, hereafter "Downing Affidavit"), between the years 2000-
2002, terminations increased by 1,100%; unemployment insurance collection work 
increased by 800%; human resources grievances increased by 300%; unemployment 
compensation information releases increased by 195%; Workforce Appeals Board cases 
increased by 69%; Lower Appeals Cases increased by 65.5%; unemployment insurance 
bankruptcy work increased by 58%; unemployment compensation and public assistance 
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rules work increased by 50%, and contract work increased by 34%. (Downing Affidavit, 
R. 727-840, at 19.) 
16. In addition, according to Ms. Downing, the Utah Legislature transferred 
responsibility for the collection of public assistance overpayments from State Office of 
Recovery Services to DWS, thus shifting all responsibility for that work to DWS' legal 
staff from the office of the State Attorney General. (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at 
19.) 
17. By Ms. Downing's own testimony, the increase in workload imposed by the 
foregoing was to be absorbed "by the Department's existing Legal Counsel". (Downing 
Affidavit, R. 727-840, at 19.) 
18. In this position, Plaintiff received annual performance appraisals; prior to 
2003, all such appraisals had been extremely favorable. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, 
H 17 and Exhibit 6.) 
19. In his 2003 performance appraisal, however, Plaintiffs performance score 
was dropped 21 points from his 2002 performance rating, resulting in an "unsuccessful" 
rating. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, H 18 and Exhibits 7 and 8.) 
20. Plaintiffs supervisor, Tani Downing, gave no objective, measurable 
evidence to support the reduction in rating, but claimed reliance on unsubstantiated 
information which she refused to share with Plaintiff. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, If 19 
and Exhibit 8.) 
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21. Plaintiff challenged his 2003 performance rating through public employee 
grievance process before DWS' Executive Director, Raylene Ireland, noting that his 
performance had been exemplary despite increased workload, and that his job description 
failed to offer objective performance standards or criteria. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, 
U 20 and Exhibit 5). 
22. In answer to Plaintiffs grievance before the Executive Director, his 
supervisor acknowledged errors in her conducting of Plaintiff s performance appraisal 
and could not offer any specific elements, criteria, or evidence of Plaintiff s job failure. 
She did not respond to Plaintiffs statement in his Response that his share of the 
Workforce Appeals Board caseload doubled from 222 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
2002, to 443 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2003. Instead she insisted that "the other 
attorneys' assignments either had more workload than yours to begin with, or their 
workload has increased more significantly than yours has, leading to an inequity between 
what the other attorneys individually carry and what you carry." She has never produced 
any evidence to support this untrue contention. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, f 21 and 
Exhibit 9.) 
23. By letter dated September 5, 2003, DWS' Executive Director granted 
Plaintiffs appeal and awarded him a successful performance rating for 2003. (Blauer 
Affidavit, R. 406-487, If 22.) 
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24. Thereafter, though, by letter dated September 9, 2003, DWS, through 
Ms. Downing, took "corrective action" against Plaintiff (even though his "unsuccessful" 
performance rating had been overturned on appeal) by reassigning him to conduct 
administrative law hearings full-time. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, f 23 and Exhibit 10; 
Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, f 39.) 
25. As such, Plaintiff was stripped of all duties, functions and responsibilities 
as legal counsel and could only conduct administrative hearings as an Administrative Law 
Judge in a forum for which a Juris Doctorate Degree is not required. Id. 
26. Plaintiffs responsibilities after his "reassignment" are, in fact, the mirror 
image of the Utah State Department of Human Resource Management's job description 
for "Administrative Law Judge - Non-Juris Doctorate." Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at 
Exhibit 2.) 
27. Simultaneously, Ms. Downing advertised for a new Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel and promoted Tiffany Vincent, then an Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris 
Doctorate into the position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III with its accompanying raise 
in status, classification, pay range, opportunity, and level of duties and responsibilities. 
Ms. Vincent's reassignment was treated as a promotion. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, 
\ 24 and Exhibit 11.) 
28. Ms. Downing's reasons for Plaintiffs "reassignment" were somewhat 
vague in her September 9 memo (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at Exhibit 10). In DWS' 
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submittals to the trial court in support of its motions, though, Ms. Downing was far more 
voluble concerning Plaintiffs supposed job failings, alleging (without opportunity for 
cross-examination): 
• That Plaintiff was "often out of his office and unable to be found" 
(Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at ffif 10, 12, and 21); 
• That he was "not always in court when scheduled on our internal calendar" 
(Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at ^ 10); 
• That he was "doing non-DWS work during work hours" (Downing 
Affidavit, R. 727-840, at ffif 10, 14, and 35); 
• That he was "falling asleep in meetings" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, 
atfflflO, 11 and 14); 
• That he was "spending too much time during business hours visiting with 
one of the claimant representatives" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at 
ffif 10, 13 and 14); 
• That he was "putting his workload off on others to do" (Downing Affidavit, 
R. 727-840, at 110); 
• That some of his unemployment insurance cases "missed the appropriate 
time lapse" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at f^ 14); 
678725v2 16 
That he did not "meet the minimum federally mandated requirement in two 
areas associated with his handling of UI cases" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-
840, at If 14); 
That he had "too many proofreading errors in his decisions" (Downing 
Affidavit, R. 727-840, atf 14); 
That he was "not a hard worker" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at f 14); 
That he "did not carry the workload that his co-workers were carrying" 
(Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at ffif 14 and 26); 
That he was "not answering public assistance information release questions 
from our internal clients in a timely manner" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-
840, at 1| 20); 
That he supposedly "plagiarized" submittals by counsel in the preparation 
of decisions through "cutting and pasting" language from the parties' 
arguments (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at ^ 23); 
That he "permitted Collections staff to file thousands of legal documents 
using his signature stamp and without his review of the documents" in 
violation of Rule 11 (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at Tf 30); 
That he had not "provided sufficient legal counsel to the department that a 
risk analysis was required by Section 35A-4-312 to be performed before the 
department could release certain information even though he had been legal 
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counsel assigned to that area for a number of years" (Downing Affidavit, R. 
727-840, at 1f 30); and 
• That Defendant's Board Chair, Becky Thomas, so objected to Plaintiffs job 
performance that, if he were assigned to any more Board cases "she would 
not use him and would exercise her statutory authority to hire her own legal 
counsel at the Department's expense" (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at 
134); 
29. DWS openly admitted that it "reassigned" Plaintiff to a full-time ALJ as a 
direct and proximate result of its assessment of his perceived job deficiencies: 
The plaintiffs assignments also changed based upon things such as (a) a 
request from the Chair of the Board due to Plaintiffs poor performance on 
board cases as set forth and summarized in her e-mail to me attached hereto 
as Exhibit 5;3 (b) complaints regarding his handling of public assistance 
information released that caused that assignment to be transferred to other 
counsel, and (c) reassignment of the prosecution board and subplans 
responsibilities. 
(Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at t 25.) 
30. Yet D WS maintained that Plaintiff was not demoted based on job 
performance issues. (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, at f 52.) 
31. Prior to his demotion, Plaintiff had notified DWS that, due to health 
problems, he had difficulty performing the responsibilities of an Administrative Law 
3
 The referenced e-mail was from Board Chair, Becky Thomas. No copy of that 
e-mail was ever shown to Plaintiff until well after this case had been filed-and shortly 
after Ms. Thomas' death. 
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Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate (although he could, and still can, perform the duties of 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to DWS with reasonable accommodation). DWS' 
demotion of Plaintiff to Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate was thus made 
with full knowledge that, due to physical constraints, he was unable to perform the 
functions of that position full time. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, ^ 25 and Exhibits 12-
15.) 
32. For her part, Ms. Downing actually maintained before the lower court that 
Plaintiffs demotion was undertaken to accommodate his disabilities - despite his 
attending physician's characterization of the demotion as a "blueprint to destroy the 
man". (Downing Affidavit, R. 727-840, f 39; Affidavit of Tom Cantrell, hereafter 
"Cantrell Affidavit", R. 398-405,1f 12.) 
33. DWS persisted in claiming that Plaintiffs demotion was the product of 
poor performance, even though (1) no documentation of such poor performance was ever 
produced in response to Plaintiffs requests; (2) neither DWS nor DHRM had articulated 
measurable, objective performance criteria against which to measure Plaintiffs 
performance as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III; and (3) measurement of Plaintiff s job 
performance in 2003 failed to take into account a nearly three-fold increase in workload 
from 1998 to 2003. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, \ 26.) 
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34. Plaintiffs demotion was accomplished without prior warning to Plaintiff, or 
opportunity for him to be heard by the department head on the reasons for the demotion. 
(See Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, Tf 27.) 
35. Plaintiff thereafter filed a grievance concerning his demotion with DWS' 
Executive Director pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-19a-302. By letter dated 
October 14, 2003, and without hearing on the issue of whether DWS had cause to demote 
Plaintiff, DWS upheld Plaintiffs demotion by his supervisor, contending the action was 
simply a reassignment because, "you retain your title as legal counsel and you maintain 
the same pay and pay range. It is not a demotion." (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, f^ 28 
and Exhibit 16.) This, even though Plaintiffs "reassignment" was taken as a "corrective 
action," deriving from allegations of poor job performance. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-
487, ffi[ 23 and 26 and Exhibit 10.) 
36. Incident to its denial of Plaintiff s grievance, DWS, through its agents and 
representatives, made disparaging remarks concerning his health condition. (Cantrell 
Affidavit, R.398-405, atffij 5-18.) 
37. Plaintiff thereafter appealed DWS' decision to the CSRB, whose 
administrator declined jurisdiction on November 12, 2003, claiming that Plaintiff raised 
no grievance reviewable by CSRB under existing law, as DWS' "corrective action" was 
not a "demotion." (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487,129 and Exhibit 17.) 
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38. On December 2, 2003, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of CSRB's 
declination of jurisdiction; by order dated December 22, 2003, CSRB's administrator 
denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, and again refused to permit CSRB to hear 
Plaintiffs grievance. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, t 30 and Exhibits 1 and 2 to 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, R. 47-352.) 
39. Due to his inability to perform as Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris 
Doctorate for health reasons, Plaintiff has been constrained by DWS' actions to exhaust 
leave furnished under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1992, and to expend accrued sick 
leave (as DWS has refused to grant Plaintiff administrative leave). (Blauer Affidavit, R. 
406-487, If 31.) 
40. In spite of its actions, DWS has refused to furnish Plaintiff with any 
documentation (or other competent evidence to which he could articulate a response) 
concerning his allegedly substandard performance justifying his demotion. (Blauer 
Affidavit, R. 406-487, ^ 32.) 
41. Effective November 3, 2004 (after the date of the trial court's ruling 
herein), Mr. Blauer was finally and permanently terminated as a state employee. (See 
letter of termination, Attachment 3 hereto.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs "reassignment" to the duties of an Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris 
Doctorate, from those of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, was clearly a demotion, whether 
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or not it cost him an immediate cut in pay or benefits. Under governing case law, whether 
a change in public employment is or is not a demotion turns on many factors, of which 
loss of pay and benefits is only one. Under applicable precedent, Plaintiff was clearly 
demoted: he lost position, responsibility, and (due to his inability to perform the duties to 
which he was transferred) his career. 
Neither may DWS avoid the fact of its demotion of Plaintiff by claiming that it did 
not alter his job title. It is position, not title, which classifies a career service employee 
under the statutory job classification system established by the Utah Legislature. If 
Plaintiff has been "reassigned" to function as an Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris 
Doctorate, the law mandates that he become one; DWS may not arrogate to itself the right 
to simply define away the fact of Plaintiff s demotion under regulatory language which (if 
interpreted as DWS urged before the trial court) would subvert the classification system 
entirely. 
Plaintiffs demotion was accomplished without any of the statutorily-mandated 
procedural safeguards intended for career service employees by the legislature. He 
received no CSRB hearing or prehearing, no opportunity to tell his side of the story on 
which DWS unilaterally relied in its decision to demote him, and no directive from the 
Career Service Review Board that DWS step forward and prove, by substantial evidence, 
that his demotion was for just cause. Neither did Plaintiff receive even the semblance of 
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constitutional due process incident to deprivation of his property rights in continued 
employment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, UNDER GOVERNING 
CASE LAW, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT "DEMOTED55 WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-302(l). 
Put simply, the trial court opted for an ultra-simplistic approach to the question of 
whether or not Plaintiff was demoted when, as a matter of "corrective action," he was 
"reassigned" from Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to the responsibilities of 
Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate in September 2003 (even when the action 
was taken with full knowledge that physical limitations precluded his performance of the 
lower position). Without immediate loss of money or benefits, the court concluded, no 
demotion has occurred as a matter of law. The trial court's position in this regard, 
however, ignores both the plain language of DHRM Rule 477-1-1(32) and governing case 
law in this area, including this Court's prior declarations on the subject. 
A. Regulatory Definition. 
Utah Admin. Code R477-l-l(32) offers a broad definition of the term "demotion": 
An action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary range or the 
movement of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or 
position having a lower salary range, which may include a reduction in 
salary.. . 
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(Emphasis added.) The language of DHRM's definition is not quoted or referenced in the 
trial court's memorandum decision, and the offered rationale ignores its terms completely. 
By law, a demotion may, but need not, include a loss of salary; it may, but need not, 
involve loss of a job, etc. The trial court's reasoning simply cannot be squared with the 
governing regulatory language, and must fail on that basis alone. 
B. The Draughon Decision. 
The lower court's rationale moreover, was challenged and expressly rejected by 
this Court in the case of Draughon v. Dep 't of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT App. 042, 
975 P.2d 935.4 A copy of the Draughon decision is attached as Attachment 4. In 
Draughon, a state career service employee challenged his "reassignment" from the 
position of Financial Institution's Manager to Financial Institution's Specialist, claiming 
that he had been "demoted" without cause, since the latter position entailed less 
responsibility, lower status, and a lower pay range. The state countered that 
Mr. Draughon had not been "demoted" in that his salary had remained the same, and that 
his reassignment was simply made "to better utilize his skills." As in this case, the lower 
court found for the state on the basis that Mr. Draughon had not been "demoted," having 
not lost pay or benefits. 
4
 DHRM, in fact, amended the rule quoted at subpoint A., above, in order to 
conform to the Court of Appeal's decision in Draughon (which interpreted a prior version 
of the same rule that in fact limited "demotions" to situations involving loss of pay or 
benefits); however CSRB and DWS have failed to conform to the rule as amended . 
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This court reversed. In rejecting the rule requiring a salary reduction for a 
movement to a lower position to be considered a demotion, this Court relied on "what is 
commonly understood as a 'demotion.' Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 338 
(1986) defines "demote" as "1 : to reduce to a lower grade or rank 2: to relegate to a less 
important position." This Court then stated {supra at 938): 
Here, appellant's involuntary reassignment was in fact a demotion. Though 
he suffered no immediate loss of pay, appellant's new position as a 
Financial Institutions Specialist has less status, fewer responsibilities, a 
lower pay range, and will ultimately result in commensurately lower 
retirement benefits. 
The net effect of Plaintiff s demotion places him squarely within the Draughon 
decision's underlying rationale. Like Draughon, Plaintiff suffered a job change entailing 
less status, fewer responsibilities; lessened prospects for advancement, loss of opportunity 
to apply current skills and credentials, a significant a lower pay range, and lower 
retirement benefits. 
1. Reason Given for Demotion. This Court should begin its analysis with the 
logical inquiry which both CSRB and the trial court failed to raise: what was the stated 
reason for the "reassignment"? By her own admission, Ms. Downing, as Director of 
Legal Services/Appeals for DWS, was taking "corrective action" against Plaintiff, based 
upon a litany of accusations concerning "poor performance" (Statement of Facts, above, 
at Yh 28-29). It was no simple shuffling of responsibilities, given the dramatic increase in 
departmental workload, as described in the record both by Plaintiff and Ms. Downing 
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(Statement of Facts, above, at fflf 14-17). DWS clearly needed all the Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel at its disposal, if not more. Plaintiff was being punished for allegations that he 
was not doing his job properly - allegations that he never had an opportunity to rebut. 
2. Pay Range and Retirement Benefits. Plaintiff has been moved from the 
job responsibilities of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, which has a step range of 63-78 
and pay range of $25.05-$37.63, to the job responsibilities of Administrative Law 
Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate which has a much lower step range of only 51-66 and a salary 
range of $18.09-$27.18. Plaintiff is currently at step 76, 10 steps above the highest step 
for an Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate. Assuming that the position itself 
follows upon "reassignment"or "demotion" to the duties of the position (which it must -
see Point II, below), with or without an immediate cut in pay or benefits, Plaintiff has 
been placed against a glass ceiling - as Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate, 
he cannot hope for any advance in salary or an increase in benefits, no matter how long he 
works or how well he performs. 
Plaintiffs demotion, though, imposes a far more fundamental impact upon his 
earning, benefit and retirement prospects than questions of step or salary ranges. Plaintiff 
cannot conduct administrative hearings full-time, due to physical restraints - a fact well-
known to DWS representatives at the time of his "reassignment". As such, DWS's 
actions have cost Plaintiff his job. He was forced, first, to rely upon the Family Medical 
Leave Act, and accrued sick leave, to maintain his income and standing as a career 
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service employee in the face of his physical inability to perform the tasks to which he was 
"reassigned". As these leave benefits were exhausted, he was compelled to seek long-
term disability. In November 2004, DWS terminated his employment because he had 
been on long term disability for a year. Taken together, these facts clearly establish a 
situation which "will ultimately result in commensurately lower retirement benefits," and 
a "lower pay range." CSRB's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction over Plaintiffs grievance 
in this regard, on the grounds that there was no "demotion," and the lower Court's 
affirmation of that decision, simply ignore the realities of DWS' actions. 
3. Job Status and Responsibilities. DHRM's job description for the title of 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III is found in the record at R. 419-421 (Blauer Affidavit, 
R. 406-487, at Exhibit 1, pp. 5-6). Required education is that of Juris Doctorate, and 
active membership in the Utah State Bar Association. The description states the 
following concerning the purpose and distinguishing characteristics of the position: 
Incumbents in this job provide legal advice to agency management, 
personnel, the Work Force Appeals Board, Agency Executive Directors, the 
commissioner on decisions of Administrative Law Judges, and/or the entire 
agency. Incumbent acts as chief liaison between their agencies and the 
Attorney General's office. Incumbent may functionally or directly 
supervise legal counsel, legal support staff, investigators, and/or auditors. 
Examples of tasks (to the extent not included in the foregoing) are given as 
"facilitates resolution of civil and administrative actions; represents agency at hearings... 
takes administrative action against violators of statutes and rules... represents the State 
or the employing agency in lawsuits, grievances, and complaints... prepares cases by 
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conducting legal research and gathering evidence . . . ." The position requires knowledge 
of applicable laws, rules, regulations, policies and procedures, rules of evidence, research 
methods, civil and criminal justice laws, etc. Required skills include the ability to 
"provide consultation and/or expert advice or testimony . . . coordinate the activities or 
tasks of people, groups and/or organizations . . . make a decision or solve a problem by 
using logic to identify key facts, explore alternatives, and propose quality solutions . . . 
interpret and apply legal decisions and identify current and emerging trends in 
interpretation . . . perform legal research using case law and appropriate techniques." 
Contrast these requirements and functions with those implicated in the job title of 
Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate (R. 425-426, Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-
487, at Exhibit 2). No Juris Doctorate degree or Bar membership is required. The 
organizational and analytical skills required of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III are absent. 
In its every aspect, the position is of a lower status, requiring lesser skills, calling upon 
fewer abilities, offering less variety, etc. 
DWS's "reassignment" of Plaintiff to the conducting of administrative law 
hearings full-time (regardless of what "title" or "position" it is argued that he retained -
see Point 2, below), Plaintiff has been confined, on the basis of untried accusations of job 
performance deficiencies, to the duties and responsibilities of a lesser position. To 
suggest that such a "reassignment" is not a "demotion" under Draughon is simply 
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untenable; to hold (as to the Trial Court) that no facts could establish it as a demotion is 
even more untenable. 
C. The Hooks Decision. 
The Draughon decision is in full accord with case law from the Tenth Circuit, 
interpreting the nature of "demotion" in a different context. 
In Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 
1993) the court held that a reassignment is a demotion if the employee " . . . can show that 
he receives less pay, has less responsibility, or is required to utilize a lesser degree of skill 
than his previous assignment". Demotion is determined by a loss of any one of these 
three elements: (1) status, opportunity, responsibility, and function; or (2) opportunity to 
exercise one's best skills and credentials, or (3) pay. The presence of any one of those 
three elements makes it a demotion. 
Under Hooks v. Diamond as well as Draughon, then, CSRB should have treated 
loss of pay or pay range as only one of three factors the presence of any one of which 
determines that an employee action is an appealable demotion. It should also have taken 
into consideration the impact of the transfer on Plaintiffs status, opportunity, 
responsibility and function, and loss of opportunity to exercise his skills and credentials. 
In his new position (had he been able to fill it given his disability), Plaintiff did not even 
need to be a lawyer. Plaintiff was stripped of a career as a legal professional which he 
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had built up through years of education and practice; that he did not end up with a smaller 
paycheck is a meaningless palliative. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY ADOPTION 
OF CSRB'S CLAIM THAT, BECAUSE HIS TITLE WAS NOT 
CHANGED, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT "DEMOTED" 
In its ruling declining jurisdiction of Plaintiff s grievance, CSRB attempted to 
distinguish Draughon by observing that in Plaintiffs case the title supposedly remains the 
same. According to its Administrator, Plaintiff had not been demoted at all, due to two 
decisive factors: Plaintiff had maintained his "position" and maintained his pay. The 
Administrator states at pages 3-4 of his initial decision: 
An administrative review of the file in the instant case establishes that 
throughout the events giving rise to this grievance, [Plaintiff] has 
maintained his position as a legal counselor with the Department. 
Moreover, there has been no reduction in his salary nor his salary range . . . 
In the instant case, a thorough review of the file establishes that [Plaintiff] 
has not been reduced to a lower grade or rank, nor has he been assigned a 
different, let alone, less important position. [Plaintiff] continues to hold his 
position or title as "Legal Counsel" and maintains his same pay and pay 
range . . . 
(The trial court, as noted above, took an even simpler approach: without an immediate 
loss of current salary level or other employment benefit, demotion did not, as a matter of 
law, occur. As a summary judgment ruling is sustainable on alternate legal theories, 
however, Plaintiff addresses CSRB's rationale as well - see Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P. 2d 231 (Utah 1989).) 
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To begin with, the CSRB rationale, no less than that of the trial court, ignores the 
fundamental attribute of Plaintiff s "reassignment" which renders it a demotion regardless 
of labels or perquisites: physical impairments, known to DWS at the time of the change, 
precluded Plaintiff from performing the duties assigned. A "reassignment" which 
deliberately positions the employee to fail cannot be other than a demotion. 
Yet even if the Administrator's position is viewed in the absence of this fact, 
CSRB erred in finding that Plaintiff was not demoted under law. Plaintiff was, literally 
and absolutely, turned from a Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to an Administrative Law 
Judge-Non- Juris Doctorate by virtue of his "reassignment" to the duties described for that 
position. An examination of the regulatory structure surrounding job descriptions for 
Utah state career employees permits no other conclusion. 
It is the loss of position, not title, that alters status and effects a demotion by 
definition under R477-l-l(32). Title does not give one status if the functions obviously 
deny the title, as they do in Plaintiffs case. Relegation of an Appeals Court Justice to the 
job title of "Justice of the Peace" would still amount to a demotion, retention of the term 
"Justice" notwithstanding. 
The Administrator's conclusion that Plaintiff was not demoted because his title did 
not change fails on several grounds. 
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A. Plaintiff was Stripped of His Job and Position. 
The Administrator erred in his conclusion that Plaintiff has in fact "maintained his 
position or title as Legal Counsel". Plaintiff s position is not "legal counselor" or "Legal 
Counsel." The working title of his historic position may be "Legal Counsel," but title is 
not position. The distinction arises from DHRM's own rules. 
Utah Admin. Code R477-1-1(32) does not address title changes - it addresses job 
or position changes. According to Utah Admin. Code R477-1-1(87) "position" is "a 
unique set of duties and responsibilities identified by DHRM authorized job and position 
management numbers (emphasis added)." If Plaintiff does not maintain that unique set of 
duties defined by DHRM authorized job and position management numbers, he has not 
"maintained his position," no matter by what title his supervisor may choose to call him. 
Utah Admin. Code R477-1-1(69) defines "job" as "[a] group of positions similar in 
duties performed, in degree of supervision exercised or required, in requirements of 
training, experience, or skill and other characteristics. The same salary range and test 
standards are applied to each position in the group." (Emphasis added.) 
"Job," then, is not a set of duties put together at the discretion of Plaintiff s 
supervisor. "Job" is a specific DHRM term denoting a DHRM classification, clarified by 
a "job description," the general class or group of positions with similar sets of 
responsibilities, duties, certification, and education/experience requirements identified by 
a main "job title." A "job description" is a general description of a group or class of 
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similar "positions" and contains "the duties, distinguishing characteristics, knowledge, 
skills, and other requirements for a job." See R477-l-l(69) and (70). DHRM is the only 
agency or entity authorized to classify positions. See § 67-19-8 and 12(3). If Plaintiff has 
the title of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, then his "job" is Legal/ Enforcement 
Counsel III, and he is to fulfill the responsibilities and perform the duties of 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III as set forth in DHRM's official job description. DWS 
Administration may then create a position description for Plaintiff specifically detailing 
the tasks he is to perform as long as they fall within the general DHRM job description 
for the job title Legal/Enforcement Counsel III 
Furthermore, a "position" may not be defined at DWS' discretion. "Position" also 
has a specific meaning under DHRM rule. A "position" is any of several possible 
combinations of the general duties and responsibilities within a specified "job." There are 
many "positions" within a "job" but those combinations arranged as a job assignment 
must be within that job description or the assignment is logically and legally "a move to 
another 'job.'" See R477-l-l(69), (70), and (87). 
A "position" is customarily identified by a working title. Plaintiffs "job" title is 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. The official DHRM job description for that title defines 
the type of duties and responsibilities Plaintiff can be assigned as long as he is in that 
"job." His "position" is the set of responsibilities set forth in his position description or 
position description questionnaire (PDQ). The working title of his "position" may be 
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Legal Counsel or Attorney or something similar. His title is not "Intake Specialist," 
"Adjudicator," or "Administrative Law Judge." Those are specific "positions" that fall 
under unique and specific "job description" set forth by DHRM, listing different job 
requirements and qualifications as required by rule. 
The official DHRM "job title" for Administrative Law Judge for DWS is 
"Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate." The "Administrative Law Judge" 
position under Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate is normally called 
"Administrative Law Judge," "Judge," or "ALJ." There is also another Administrative 
Law Judge "job." DHRM job description titles it "Administrative Law Judge II." Even 
though this Administrative Law Judge job is several rungs higher on the pay scale than 
Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate, they are both called by the same 
working titles "Administrative Law Judge," "Judge," or "ALJ;" but they are entirely 
different jobs or positions with significantly different levels of responsibility and pay. 
This misunderstanding of the legal meaning of the terms used in DHRM rule is the only 
plausible explanation for the CSRB Administrator's erroneous assumption that the shift in 
level and type of duties and responsibilities in Plaintiffs move is slight; and that it was 
not therefore a demotion. Under governing law, though, the error cannot stand. 
B. DWS Could Not Avoid the Fact of Plaintiffs Demotion by Relabeling His Job 
or Position. 
In Draughon, supra, the Court said, " . . . the agency's definition of an involuntary 
reassignment' seems entirely consistent with what is commonly understood as a 
678725v2 3 4 
'demotion.'" The Court was quite clear that an improper action cannot be sanitized by 
simple relabeling: 
We agree with appellant's counsel that Human Resources' rules 
distinguishing between a demotion and an involuntary reassignment are 
comparable to a memorable exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty: 
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it 
means just what I choose it to mean - nothing more nor less.' 'The question 
is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean different things.' 'The 
question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master - that's all.'" 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There 
(1941)." 
(Draughon, supra, at p. 938.) 
A supervisor cannot legally defeat statutorily authorized DHRM rules by simply 
renaming an appealable employment action something else that is not appealable. The 
supervisor is not master. The statute is master - and the Court, not DWS, interprets the 
statute. An appealable demotion does not become a non-appealable "reassignment" just 
because DWS wants to call it that. 
In his initial decision, the Administrator interpreted Utah Admin. Code R477-3-3 
to defeat all of the foregoing, stating that the Rule "contemplates the very actions the 
Department took in this case." Rule R477-3-3 states as follows: 
Management may assign, modify, or remove any employee task or 
responsibility in order to accomplish reorganization, improve business 
practices or process, or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the 
department administration. 
The rule, though, must be interpreted in the context of the governing Personnel 
Management Act wherein DHRM is to perform the functions of "design and 
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administration of the state classification system and procedures for determining schedule 
assignments." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8, DHRM "may not contract or 
otherwise delegate these functions to another state agency." 
Section 67-19-12(3) provides: 
1. The director [of DHRM] shall prepare, maintain, and revise a 
position classification plan for each employee position . . . to provide equal 
pay for equal work. 
2. Classification of positions shall be based upon similarity of 
duties performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job 
requirements and the same salary range may be applied equitably to each 
position in the same class. 
3. The director shall allocate or reallocate the position of each 
employee in classified service to one of the classes in the classification 
plan. 
Rule R477-3-3 must therefore be interpreted to limit management's authority to 
"assign, modify, or remove any employee task or responsibility" to remain within the 
confines of the employee's DHRM job description in order to "provide equal pay for 
equal work" and otherwise fulfill the requirements of similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed" so that duties, responsibilities and requirements - and salary 
range - will be "applied equitably to each position in the same class." 
If it were literally true that "[management may assign, modify, or remove any 
employee task or responsibility . . . for any . . . reason deemed appropriate by the-
department administration" without the Career Service employee having any right to 
protest or appeal - DHRM classification would be irrelevant, no employee would ever 
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have any just cause for review and redress by the CSRB, and the CSRB Administrator 
would not have a job. 
C. DWS Cannot Shelter Behind the Administrator's "Equivalent Duties" 
Argument. 
The Administrator also assumed, in error, that Plaintiffs change in assignment 
was an exchange of one set of duties for another set of duties of equal grade or rank.5 
This assumption, simply put, completely ignores the reality of Plaintiff s demotion. 
Compare the description of Plaintiff s job of Legal/Enforcement Counselor III, as 
specifically detailed by DHRM, with the description of the Administrative Law 
Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate job. (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at Exhibits 1 and 2, 
R. 4419-426.) The responsibilities and duties of the job titled Legal/ Enforcement 
Counselor III include providing "legal advice to the Workforce Appeals Board . . . on 
decisions of Administrative Law Judges, and/or the entire agency." Examples of Tasks 
include representing "the state or employing agency in lawsuits . . . " 
Plaintiffs tasks have included writing Board decisions which affirm, modify, or 
reverse Administrative Law Judge-Non-Juris Doctorate decisions and explaining where 
they erred, if in fact they erred. His tasks also have included defending Board decisions 
in the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court. In addition to hundreds of 
cases that have resulted in dismissals of appeals or unpublished decisions, Plaintiff has 
5
 The Administrator said, "[Plaintiff] has not been reduced to a lower grade or 
rank, nor has he been assigned a different, let alone, less important position." 
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represented the Board in 20 cases that resulted in published decisions by the Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court, with a seventy-five percent (75%) win rate. Plaintiff has the 
highest win rate of the current DWS Legal Counsel and more than twice the number of 
published decisions than all of the other current Legal Counsel combined. 
Pursuant to R477-l-l(69) Plaintiffs new assignment is actually a move to a new 
"job" as an Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris Doctorate which is the title of "[a] group 
of positions similar in duties performed, in degree of supervision exercised or required, in 
requirements of training, experience, or skill and other characteristics." "[TJhe movement 
of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or position having a lower salary 
range . . ." (Utah Admin. Code R477-l-l(32)) could not describe more precisely what 
was done in Plaintiffs case. Plaintiff has been "moved from one job [and] position to 
another job [and] position with a lesser pay range." It is a demotion regardless of what 
the job and position is called and regardless of what he might be paid. 
D. The Administrator Should Have Considered Other Relevant Factors in 
Determining the Fact of Plaintiff s Demotion. 
Utah Admin. Code R477-1-1(32) defines demotion as: 
An action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary range or the 
movement of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or 
position having a lower salary range, which may include a reduction in 
salary.. . 
He is thus moved "from one job or position to another job or position having a lower 
salary range," precisely the definition of a "demotion" under the rule. 
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E. Public Policy Considerations Mandate Confining DWS to the Terms of the 
Governing Regulatory Structure 
There is a final concern raised by DWS' claim that it could avoid the 
statutory/regulatory impact of demoting Plaintiff by either terming the action a "reas-
signment", or claiming discretionary authority under R477-3-3 - one that goes beyond 
Plaintiffs injury alone. State agencies must be held, in their personnel policies generally, 
to restrictions imposed by state law and DHRM regulations, in the interest of preserving 
efficient, responsive government operations. To permit DWS to disregard the structure of 
the Personnel Management Act, and DHRM regulatory structure created thereunder, 
whenever it deems such conduct warranted under its managerial discretion would 
ultimately defeat bureaucratic accountability, and foster patronage in government 
employment practices. Long-term employees (such as Plaintiff) could be shunted to one 
side in favor of personal friends and family members, with attendant loss of continuity 
and expertise - all at the expense of the taxpayer. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S DEMOTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT 
DETERMINATION OF CAUSE, AND WAS THEREFORE 
IN VIOLATION OF BOTH UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 67-19-18(l)(b) AND PLAINTIFF'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Once DWS' demotion of Plaintiff is recognized for what it was, CSRB's failure to 
afford notice and an opportunity to be heard by CSRB (or anyone else) falls afoul of both 
statutory and constitutional mandate. 
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A. Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-18 and 67-19a-202,302 and 402-408 Mandated a 
CSRB Hearing. 
Career service employees in the state of Utah are not employees at will. The Utah 
Legislature has conferred specific rights, both substantive and procedural, upon public 
employees; they may not be either terminated or demoted in derogation of those rights. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) specifically states the following: 
Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted: 
(a) to advance the good of the public service; or 
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to 
maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty 
to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or non-feasance in 
office. 
DWS' submittals to the trial court made abundantly clear that its actions against Plaintiff 
were driven by accusations of "poor performance", as detailed at length in Tani 
Downing's Affidavit (see Statement of Facts, above, at fflf 28-30). He was demoted based 
on charges falling squarely within subparagraph (b), by "reassignment" from a position 
which he had capably performed for many years to one which his attending physician had 
certified him unable to perform. 
Yet DWS, CSRB, and then the trial court failed to afford Plaintiff a meaningful 
forum in which to challenge Ms. Downing's charges, or the propriety of DWS' actions in 
light thereof. State statute flatly prohibits such denial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) states the following: 
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A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, 
suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, 
issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and 
disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of [the] grievance 
procedure. 
(Emphasis added.) The career service employee grievance procedure, set out at § 67- 19a-
402, culminates in an evidentiary proceeding before CSRB - see Utah Code Ann. § 67-
19a-402(5). Jurisdiction to hear such grievances, arising from demotions or other 
disputes arising incident to changes in employment status, is expressly conferred on 
CSRB by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202, which constitutes that body "the final 
administrative body to review appeals from career service employees and agencies of 
decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable 
administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of 
position that have not been resolved at an earlier stage in the grievance procedure." Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-403 through 408 sets out the procedure to be followed by CSRB in 
reviewing the employee's grievance and issuing its decision thereon, including (1) an 
initial determination of jurisdiction (as far as CSRB got in this instance); appointment of 
a hearing officer to review the grievance; the conducting of a prehearing conference; the 
convening and conducting of an evidentiary hearing before a certified shorthand reporter; 
the taking of evidence from the employing agency which has the burden of proof in issues 
involving demotion (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)); a right of appeal to the entire 
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Career Service Review Board if the employee is dissatisfied with the hearing officer's 
determination; and Board review of the transcript incident to its own determination on the 
merits. 
Yet DWS persuaded CSRB to sidestep the clear import of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-18(l)(b), and the procedural guarantees of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-201, etseq., 
by imposing a demotion with the deceptive "reassignment" moniker attached, even 
admitting after the fact that it was in response to undocumented, unchallenged claims of 
"poor performance". Plaintiff received no hearing; DWS was put to no proof of its 
charges; and Plaintiff was left either to accept a job which he was physically incapable of 
performing, or risk a charge of job abandonment (which charge has now matured into 
actual termination). 
B. Plaintiff was Not Afforded Even the Rudiments of Fundamental Due Process. 
Plaintiff has not only been denied his statutory procedural due, but has not been 
afforded even the basic notice and hearing mandated by constitutional considerations of 
due process. 
It is by now too well-established to require comment that a public employee has a 
constitutionally-protected property interest in continued employment, arising out of state 
law. Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 
1470 (10th Cir. 1992); West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1992); Bailey v. 
Kirk, 111 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985); Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm yn, 949 
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P.2d 746 (UT App. 1997). Under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and article I, § 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, such rights 
may not be revoked, damaged or impacted by state action until the employee has been 
afforded due process. 
Plaintiff has to date seen nothing even resembling due process in connection with 
his demotion. While case law has made clear that the process constitutionally due in aid 
of state-created property rights is for the courts - not the state legislature - to determine 
(Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480 (1980), and distinguishing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974))6, it has 
mandated a careful examination of what process is afforded prior to deprivation of 
property rights according to specified criteria. 
In the case of Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) the Supreme Court offered 
an extensive explanation of due process requirements implicated in the loss of public 
employment rights. Therein, the Court, in reviewing process which attended the 
suspension of a police officer, observed the following: 
To determine what process is constitutionally due, we have generally 
balanced three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that would be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
6In other words, the process constitutionally required in aid of public employment 
is not necessarily dictated by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101, et seq., although those 
requirements remain statutorily incumbent on DWS, and (had they been followed) would 
certainly have satisfied the requirements of due process. 
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the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest. 
[Citations omitted.] 
520 U.S. at 931. 
Plaintiff was entitled to test his demotion in a proceeding meeting the foregoing 
standard. Yet DWS, then CSRB, and finally the trial court, refused him any forum for 
challenging his "corrective action," because it bore the wrong label and cost him no salary 
or benefits at the moment imposed - even though his physical inability to perform the 
"reassigned" duties has now rendered him jobless. The "private interest" impacted by 
DWS' official action, Plaintiffs ability to pursue continued employment, received 
knowing and callous disregard; DWS' clear error in depriving Plaintiff thereof received 
no hearing; additional and/or substitute safeguards received no considerate; and the 
government was never put to the task of demonstrating that its interest was impacted in 
any meaningful way. There is, in fact, no need to address deficiencies or shortcomings in 
Plaintiffs pre-demotion process, as there was no process. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental failing of both the state agencies and the trial court are simple. 
Plaintiff never had the opportunity to confront and refute DWS' litany of supposed 
performance shortcomings. As such, DWS (by characterizing its "corrective action" as a 
"reassignment" instead of a demotion) has not been compelled to demonstrate proper 
grounds for demotion. DWS has never done more than make unfounded and 
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unchallenged accusations to establish "just cause" for his demotion - the only basis 
recognized by Utah law for its actions. 
In fact, Plaintiffs performance has been exemplary. He has continued to perform 
well even in the face of an exponential increase in workload. Ms. Downing's after-the-
fact charges in her affidavit were not only unchallenged by any meaningful hearing (see 
below), but are without any empirical basis whatever in the record. Ms. Downing's 
attempt to saddle Plaintiff with an unfavorable performance review was specifically 
overturned by her superior. Yet (apparently in retaliation) Plaintiff was subjected to 
"corrective action" in the form of de facto demotion to a job classification which, with or 
without pay cuts, is a clear demotion. 
Plaintiff is entitled to put DWS to its burden of proof in justification of its conduct 
toward him. This matter should therefore be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
to refer Plaintiffs grievance to the Utah State Career Service Review Board for proper 
hearing. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 2005. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: . ^ > _ 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Lorin Blauer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant was hand delivered to the following this 24th day of January, 2005: 
Debra J. Moore 
J. Clifford Petersen 
Gabrielle Lee Caruso 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Department of Workforce Services 
678725v2 46 
ADDENDUM 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORTN BLAUER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
PROPOSED ORDER IN 
CONFORMANCE WITH THE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED 
AUGUST 16,2003 
Civil No. 040900221 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated August 16,2004, 
the Court hereby orders and adjudges: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Court has Jurisdiction to 
consider the matter. 
2. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and as a matter of law, the Defendant 
did not demote the Plaintiff when it assigned him to perform the duties of an administrative law 
judge. The CSRB was correct in reaching this same conclusion. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs 
First Claim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in 
Paragraph 34 subsections ©) through (j) of the complaint which do are not based upon unlawful 
demotion, and which were also set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration 
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for consideration. Those 
allegations are: A) DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et seq by failing to 
define job performance parameters; B)DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to 
Grievant falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-3-
2 and 3; C) DWS representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against 
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in violation of Utah 
Administrative Code R477-15-2 and 3; D) DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative 
Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Grievant's 
performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively 
on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel file; E). DWS violated Utah 
Administrative Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative leave; and F) Critical letters 
from Ms. Downing and Ms. Ireland, remaining in Grievant's personnel file constitute "written 
reprimands, grievable to CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 67-19a-302(l). 
3. The Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief are based upon an 
alleged unlawful demotion and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
DATED this V day of November, 2004. 
BY THB€<PURT: 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this plQ day of November, 2004,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PROPOSED ORDER IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED AUGUST 16,2003 to be mailed by United States 
mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Third Judicial District 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Plaintiff# 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 040900221 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on June 24, 
2004, in connection with various pending Motions filed by both 
parties, including the defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the 
plaintiff•s Motion for Summary Judgment; the defendant's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on these Motions, the Court 
indicated that it would take the matter under advisement to further 
consider the parties1 written submissions, the relevant legal 
authority and counsels' oral argument. Being now fully advised, 
the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court first turns to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Because of the voluminous nature of the parties' respective legal 
arguments, the Court will not restate these arguments herein. 
Rather, the Court will generally indicate that it does not find the 
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Motion to Dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons indicated in the 
plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum. Overall, the Court is satisfied 
that it has the jurisdiction to consider this matter and that the 
plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative remedies. 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
Next, the Court addresses the parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of whether the CSRB should have heard the 
plaintiff's grievance because he met the jurisdictional threshold 
of establishing that he had been demoted. In assessing this 
issue, this Court must determine as a matter of law whether the 
plaintiff was indeed demoted and whether the Board should now 
proceed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was 
demoted for cause pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(1). 
Again, without restating the parties' detailed arguments on 
the issue of demotion, the Court concludes that the pivotal inquiry 
in determining whether a demotion occurred in this case must focus 
on the plaintiff's salary, salary range and retirement benefits. 
As the defendant points out, it is undisputed that the plaintiff 
was never formally reclassified and that his salary, salary range 
and retirement benefits were completely unaffected by the change in 
his assignment. The Court concludes that this is determinative 
evidence that the plaintiff was not demoted and that the CSRB was 
correct in reaching the same conclusion. 
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To be clear, in reaching this decision, the Court carefully 
considered the plaintiff's argument that the Court look to such 
factors as the change in his status and that his new 
responsibilities essentially fit the job description for the lower 
paying and apparently less esteemed position of Administrative Law 
Judge - Non Juris Doctorate. While the plaintiff argues this 
position admirably, the fact remains that without a commensurate 
decrease in salary or a lower salary range (or the loss of 
retirement benefits), the plaintiff cannot be considered demoted. 
The Court rules that this conclusion, which is articulated in 
greater detail in the plaintiff's moving papers, is supported by 
the definition of demotion (Utah Administrative Code R477-1-1(34)) 
and the remaining legal authorities discussed by the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Court rules that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that the plaintiff was not demoted as a matter of 
law. The defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
point is granted. 
Given the Court's decisions above, it appears that the only 
remaining issue is the CSRB's refusal to consider the plaintiff's 
remaining grievances based upon alleged violations of the personnel 
rules. The Court concludes that the plaintiff, in his Request for 
Reconsideration before the CSRB, preserved all of his remaining 
allegations concerning the defendant's violations of the Personnel 
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Management Act. In other words, the Court declines to follow the 
defendant's reasoning that these grounds for grieving were not 
raised administratively and are therefore deemed waived or that 
this Court has no jurisdiction to consider them. However, rather 
than determining whether the violations actually occurred, it 
appears from the dialogue with the plaintiff's counsel during oral 
argument, that he would prefer to have these matters transferred 
back to the CSRB for consideration. Accordingly, to the extent 
that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a renewed 
opportunity to have the CSRB consider his grievance related to the 
alleged violations of the Personnel Management Act, the Court 
grants the same and remands the matter back to the CSRB. 
It appears that the foregoing addresses all of the issues 
raised in the pending Motions. However, if the parties need 
clarification as to any of the foregoing or if an issue remains 
unaddressed, the Court requests that counsel direct a letter to the 
Court's law clerk, Alexandra C. Doctorman, indicating the same. 
The other side can of course respond to any correspondence directed 
to the Court. 
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Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order consistent with, 
but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to 
the Court for review and signature. 
Dated this \[f day of August, 2004. 
LESLIEVA. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this \\j day of 
August, 2004: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Gabrielle Lee Caruso 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
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November 3, 2004 
Lorin Blauer 
460 North 900 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Lorin: 
On October 27, 2004, Scott Steele conducted a hearing with you regarding termination of your 
employment The termination hearing was due to the fact that you have been on medical leave 
since October 8, 2003. 
On October 1, 2004. you were sent a letter regarding your return to work. You indicated 
during the hearing that you are unable to return to your previous work assignment. You were 
offered a position at the Department of Workforce Services with the same title and pay range. 
However, you have declined to accept the duties that have been assigned to this position. 
You indicated that you cannot return to the duties offered due to a sciatic nerve condition. We 
have made every attempt to make your workstation comfortable. Ergonomic equipment and 
resources have been offered to allow you to complete your duties while standing, sitting, or 
moving about your office. There are also breaks between hearings that allow you to move 
about the building. 
In addition, you have been approved for Long Term Disability for a different condition, and not 
for sciatic nerve problems. 
I have no choice but to terminate your employment. This decision is based upon your medical 
leave of longer than one year, and the fact that we offered you a job, which you declined. 
The termination will be effective November 3, 2004. If you wish to appeal this decision, you 
have twenty working days from the date of this decision to appeal to the Career Service Review 
Board, 1120 State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
You inquired as to whether it would be considered a conflict of interest if you advise UI 
claimants if you are no longer employed at the Department of Workforce Services. I see no 
conflict of interest once you are removed from DWS payroll. 
Sincerely, 
RaylerW GiIreland 
ExecutivcTDirector 
Uah! 
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1999 UTApp 42, * ; 975 P.2d 935, * * ; 
363 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 14, * * * 
Ronald R. Draughon, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Department of Financial Institutions, State of 
Utah; Department of Human Resource Management, State of Utah; Career Service Review 
Board, State of Utah; G. Edward Leary, in his individual and official capacities; Karen Suzuki-
Okabe, in her individual and official capacities; and Robert N. White, in his individual and 
official capacities, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 970554-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
1999 UTApp 42; 975 P.2d 935; 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 3; 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 14 
February 19, 1999, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * * l ] Third District, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant employee sought review of decision of the Third 
District, Salt Lake Department (Utah), which granted summary judgment in favor of 
appellee agencies in appellant's grievance over his involuntary assignment. 
OVERVIEW: Appellant employee worked for appellee agencies. He was "involuntarily 
reassigned," which was distinguished in the agency rules from a "demotion." Appellant's 
grievance was dismissed. The reviewing court found that the dismissal of his grievance 
was improper. The relevant agency rules, Utah Admin. Code R477-l- l (27), (57) (1996), 
distinguished between the two actions. However, there were less procedural protections 
for a worker who was involuntarily reassigned. The reviewing court found that appellees' 
definition of an "involuntary reassignment" was entirely consistent with what is 
commonly understood as a "demotion." Therefore, the rules impermissibly altered the 
statute they were enacted under, Utah Code § 67-19a-302, which provided protections 
for demotions, and contravened the legislative intent of the statute. 
OUTCOME: A decision that granted summary judgment in favor of appellee agencies in 
appellant employee's grievance over his involuntary assignment was reversed and 
remanded because appellees* regulations contravened the legislative intent of the statute 
under which they were enacted. 
CORE TERMS: reassignment, involuntary, demotion, demoted, regulation, reduction, career, 
salary range, salary, loss of pay, grievance, involuntarily, skills, department head, amicus 
brief, grieve, corrective action, summary judgment, promulgated, utilize, Personnel 
Management Act, governing statute, statutory scheme, dispositive, deference, illusory, 
harmony, enlarge, invalid, agency head 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts - • Hide Concepts 
Civil Pnocedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard "m 
H/VI±Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Because a challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of 
law, appellate courts accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions but review 
them for correctness. Additionally, questions of statutory construction are matters 
of law, and appellate courts give no deference to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of a statute absent certain circumstances. More Like This Headnote 
Administrative Law > Separation & Delegation of Power > Legislative Controls V*J3 
H / V 2±I t is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be 
consistent with its governing statute. Courts adhere to this principle because an 
administrative rule out of harmony or in conflict with the express provisions of a 
Statute would in effect amend that Statute. More Like This Headnote 
Administrative Law > Separation & Delegation of Power > Legislative Controls ••AII 
HN3±An administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations is limited to those 
regulations which are consonant with the statutory framework, and neither contrary 
to the statute nor beyond its scope. Administrative regulations may not conflict 
with the design of an act, and when they do the court has a duty to invalidate 
them. Furthermore, when an administrative official misconstrues a statute and 
issues a regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of administrative 
authority granted. Agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend, or modify 
a Statute. More Like This Headnote 
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials km 
HN4±See Utah Code Ann. S 67-19-18(1) (1996). 
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials 
HN5±Career service employees who are either dismissed or demoted have procedural 
protections under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302 (1996). These protections include 
appealing grievances to the administrator, who may appoint a hearing officer to 
adjudicate the complaint. If still dissatisfied, and if the appeal meets specific 
statutory criteria, the employee may appeal to the Career Services Review Board. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-402 to -408. However, a career service employee may 
grieve all other matters only to the level of his department head, and the decision 
of the department head is final and unappealable to the Career Services Board. 
Utah Code Ann. 5 67-19a-302. The statutory scheme does not address the 
procedural protections for an involuntary reassignment. More Like This Headnote 
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials *«! 
HN6±See Utah Admin. Code R477-l- l(27), (57) (1996). 
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials •& 
HN7±See Utah Admin. Code R477-7-4 (9), (11) 
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THE RESULT: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
OPINION: [ * *936] OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
[*P1] Appellant Ronald Draughon (Appellant) appeals from a grant of summary judgment 
to the Department of Financial Institutions (the Department) and the Department of Human 
Resource Management 
(Human Resources) upholding rules promulgated by Human Resources allowing his 
involuntary reassignment without the procedural protections required for a demotion. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
[*P2] Appellant is a career civil service employee of the Department. From 1988 to 1996 
he held the position of Financial Institutions Manager with the working title of Supervisor of 
Savings and Loans. [ * * * 2 ] This position placed appellant in a pay range with steps from 
53 to 68, and as of 1996 he was being paid at step 61. In January 1996, appellant was 
"involuntarily reassigned" to the position of Financial Institutions Specialist with a working 
title of Senior Examiner and a pay range with steps from 51 to 65. Appellant's current pay 
was unchanged. The Department's decision was made pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R477-
7-4(9) (1996), which defines Involuntary Reassignment: 
Positions may be filled by involuntarily reassigning staff without a reduction in pay within the 
agency . . . with approval of the respective agency heads for administrative reasons such as 
budget constraints, corrective action pursuant to R477-10-2, or the need to move persons to 
positions that better utilize their skills. 
Appellant was told the involuntary reassignment was made "to better utilize his skills." 
[*P3] Appellant grieved his involuntary reassignment, but was denied a hearing before the 
Career Services Review Board. He also filed a Petition for Rules Change with Human 
Resources, contending that Human Resources' rules, distinguishing between a demotion and 
an involuntary reassignment, made an [ * * * 3 ] illusory distinction and denied him his 
grievance rights. Appellant argued that his involuntary reassignment was in fact a demotion, 
though he suffered no immediate loss of pay. Human Resources did not act on appellant's 
petition. Appellant later filed a complaint in district court alleging, among other things, that 
the Human Resources rules were invalid as they were contrary to the Personnel Management 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. 5 67-19-18(1) (1996). The trial court dismissed appellant's 
complaint. Appellant now brings this appeal. 
ANALYSIS n l 
Footnotes 
n l The Department has filed a Motion to Strike an amicus brief offered by the Utah Public 
Employees' Association (UPEA), arguing that UPEA has only raised issues not raised below. 
We disagree. Though UPEA raises some novel issues, at least one part of its brief touches on 
the primary focus of this appeal. Thus, "consistent with the well-settled rule that an amicus 
brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues on appeal, we . . . only consider[] those portions of 
the amicus brief that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to this appeal." Madsen v. 
Borthlck, 658 P.2d 627. 629 n.3 (Utah 1983) (internal citations omitted). We therefore deny 
the motion in part and grant the motion in part. 
End Footnotes [***4] 
[*P4] ""^"^Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues 
[ * *937] of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
'Because a challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of law, we 
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions but review them for correctness.'" 
Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961, 964 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
Additionally, "questions of statutory construction are matters of law, and we give no 
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute absent certain 
circumstances, none of which exist here." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., 846 P.2d 
1304, 1305 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
[*P5] Human Resources argues that we should uphold its rules distinguishing between a 
demotion and an involuntary reassignment if the definitions are reasonable. See RjO.A.jGeji^ 
Inc. v. Department of Transp., 966 P.2d 840, 843 (Utah 1998). While we agree with this 
principle in the abstract, the dispositive issue here is whether the rules promulgated by 
Human Resources that distinguish between a demotion and an involuntary reassignment, 
without an immediate loss [ * * * 5 ] of pay, are in harmony with section 67-19-18(1) (1996). 
n2 "HN2~+'it is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be 
consistent with its governing statute.'" Crossroads Plaza, 912 P.2d at 965 (quoting Sanders 
Brine Shrimp, 846 P.2d at 1306). We adhere to this principle because "'an administrative rule 
out of harmony or in conflict with the express provisions of a statute "would in effect amend 
that statute.""' Id. (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 
P.2d 514, 532 (Utah 1994) (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting)) (additional citations 
omitted). 
Footnotes 
n2 Because we conclude this issue is dispositive, we do not reach appellant's constitutional 
arguments. See R.O.A. Gen.r Inc. v. Department of Transp., 966 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1998) 
("We do not reach [appellant's] constitutional arguments because we can resolve this case on 
statutory grounds.") (citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) (holding 
constitutional questions are not to be addressed where courts can determine the merits on 
other grounds). 
End Footnotes [ * * * 6 ] HN3T 
An administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations is limited to those regulations 
which are consonant with the statutory framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor 
beyond its scope. Administrative regulations "may not conflict with the design of an Act, and 
when they do the court has a duty to invalidate them. . . . Furthermore, when an 
administrative official misconstrues a statute and issues a regulation beyond the scope of a 
statute, it is in excess of administrative authority granted." . . . Agency regulations may not 
"abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] statute . . . ." 
Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
[*P6] We review the governing statute and the rules at issue in this appeal against this 
governing legal principle. H/V4"?Section 67-19-18(1) states: 
Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted: 
(a) to advance the good of the public service; or 
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. 
Utah [ * * * 7 ] Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (1996). HN5:+Career service employees who are 
either dismissed or demoted have procedural protections under Utah Code Ann. 5 67-19a-
302 (1996). These protections include appealing grievances to the administrator, who may 
appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint. If still dissatisfied, and if the appeal 
meets specific statutory criteria, the employee may appeal to the Career Services Review 
Board. See Utah Code Ann. 55 67-19a-402 to -408. However, "[a] career service employee 
may grieve all other matters only to the level of his department head[, and t]he decision of 
the department head is final and unappealable to the [Career Services Board.]" Id. § 67-19a-
302. The statutory scheme does [ * *938] not address the procedural protections for an 
"involuntary reassignment." 
[*P7] Pursuant to his authority under section 67-19-6(l)(d), n3 the Human Resources 
director adopted rules to further the agency's statutory guidelines. These rules, unlike the 
statute, distinguish between a demotion and an involuntary reassignment. 
Footnotes 
n3 Utah Code Ann. 5 67-19-6(l)(d) (1996) states that "the director shall adopt rules for 
personnel management according to the procedures of Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act." 
End Footnotes [ * * * 8 ] HN6T 
(27) Demotion: A disciplinary action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary 
range or the movement of an incumbent from one position to another position having a lower 
salary range, including a reduction in salary. If this action is taken for a limited time period, it 
shall only be within the current salary range. 
(57) Involuntary Reassignment: Management initiated movement of an employee from his 
current position to a position of an equal or lower salary range, or to a different work location 
or organization unit for administrative, corrective action or other reasons not included in the 
definition of demotion or reclassification. 
Utah Admin. R477-l- l(27), (57) (1996). This distinction is further clarified in Rules 477-7-4 
(9) and (11): 
H/V77(9) Involuntary Reassignment 
Positions may be filled by involuntarily reassigning staff without a reduction in pay within the 
agency or across agencies with approval of the respective agency heads for administrative 
reasons such as budget constraints, corrective action pursuant to R477-10-2, or the need to 
move persons to positions that better utilize their skills. 
(11) Demotions 
Employees demoted [ * * * 9 ] consistent with R477-11-2 shall receive a salary reduction of 
one or more salary steps as determined by the agency head or designee. The agency head or 
designee may move an employee to a position with a lower salary range concurrent with the 
salary reduction. 
Utah Amin. Code R477-7-4 (9), (11) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the rules adopted by 
Human Resources place an "involuntary reassignment" in the category where an employee 
may appeal his change in status only to his department head. See Utah Code Ann. 5 67-19a-
302(2) (1996). 
[*P8] The simple question raised is whether the distinction made in the regulations 
between "involuntary reassignment" and "demotion" is consistent with the statutory scheme. 
The Legislature has plainly set forth the two situations in which a career service employee 
can be demoted or dismissed. Additionally, under section 67-19a-302, those employees that 
are "demoted" have the right to grieve such a decision "to all levels of grievance procedure." 
[*P9] However, under the rules promulgated by Human Resources, if an employee is 
"involuntarily reassigned" he does not have the same grievance opportunities as a "demoted" 
employee. Yet, the agency's [ * * * 1 0 ] definition of an "involuntary reassignment" seems 
entirely consistent with what is commonly understood as a "demotion." Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 338 (1986) defines "demote" as " 1 : to reduce to a lower grade or rank 
2: to relegate to a less important position." 
[*P10] Here, appellant's involuntary reassignment was in fact a demotion. Though he 
suffered no immediate loss of pay, appellant's new position as a Financial Institutions 
Specialist has less status, fewer responsibilities, a lower pay range, and will ultimately result 
in commensurately lower retirement benefits. 
[*P11] Thus, we hold that Human Resources' rules distinguishing between a "demotion" 
and an "involuntary reassignment," solely on the basis of an immediate loss of pay, are 
invalid because this illusory distinction contravenes the Legislature's intent to afford a career 
service employee the opportunity to fully grieve a demotion. n4 Thus, we [ * *939] reverse 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings that allow appellant 
all grievance procedures owed to a demoted employee, consistent with the Personnel 
Management Act. 
Footnotes 
n4 We agree with appellant's counsel that Human Resources' rules distinguishing between a 
demotion and an involuntary reassignment are comparable to a memorable exchange 
between Alice and Humpty Dumpty: "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in a rather 
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-nothing more nor less.' 'The question 
is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean different things.' 'The question is,' said 
Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all.'" Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
and What Alice Found There 123 (1941). 
End Footnotes [***11] 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
[*P12] I CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
[*P13] I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19. UTAH STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
§ 67-19-8. Functions of department not to be delegated 
The department shall perform the following functions and may not contract or otherwise delegate 
those functions to another state agency: 
(1) design and administration of the state pay plan; 
(2) design and administration of the state classification system and procedures for determining 
schedule assignments; 
(3) position classification studies, including periodic desk audits, except that an agency may 
conduct classification studies and desk audits as necessary under Subsection 67-19-9(2) 
consistent with a delegation agreement approved by the department; 
(4) monitoring of state agency personnel practices to determine compliance with state personnel 
guidelines, including equal employment opportunity; and 
(5) maintenance of central personnel records. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19. UTAH STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 
§ 67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions-Grounds-Disciplinary action- Procedure-Reductions 
in force 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted: 
(a) to advance the good of the public service; or 
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, disability, national origin, 
religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise of rights under this 
chapter. 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements of 
disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
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(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with aggravated misconduct 
or that retention of a career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or 
pose a grave threat to the public interest, the employee may be suspended pending the 
administrative appeal to the department head as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5)(a) A career service employee may not be demoted or dismissed unless the department head or 
designated representative has complied with this subsection. 
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the 
reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have the reply considered by 
the department head. 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department head or designated 
representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head 
finds adequate cause or reason. 
(6)(a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of workload, or lack of work are 
governed by retention rosters established by the director. 
(b) Under those circumstances: 
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be eliminated, subject to review by 
the director. 
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated before any career service 
employee. 
(iii)(A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order of their retention points, the 
employee with the lowest points to be discharged first. 
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be computed according to rules 
established by the director, allowing appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in 
state government, including any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state 
appointment. 
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force shall be: 
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 67-19-17(2); and 
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(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which the employee is qualified which 
occurs within one year of the date of the separation. 
(c)(i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the department head for 
an administrative review. 
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt 
of written notification of separation. 
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head according to the grievance 
and appeals procedure of this act. [FN1] 
[FN1] Laws 1983, c. 332. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 3. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
§ 67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible under grievance and appeals 
procedure 
(1) A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, 
written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable 
administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position 
to all levels of grievance procedure. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved employee 
(l)(a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall attempt to resolve the 
grievance through discussion with his supervisor. 
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with him, the employee's 
supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the grievance. 
(2)(a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the 
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervisor's verbal decision, the employee may 
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resubmit the grievance in writing to his immediate supervisor within five working days after the 
expiration of the period for response or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is submitted, the employee's 
supervisor shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for 
the decision. 
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervisor, the employee shall 
notify the administrator of the board that he has submitted the written grievance. 
(3)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor remains unanswered for 
five working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the 
decision issued, the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division 
director within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the 
decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is submitted, the employee's 
agency or division director shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his decision and 
the reasons for the decision. 
(4)(a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or division director remains 
unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is 
dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his 
department head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt 
of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is submitted, the department 
head shall issue a written response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the 
decision. 
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except those matters that the board 
may review under the authority of Part 3. 
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head meets the subject 
matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the grievance remains unanswered for ten 
working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision 
issued, the employee may submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working 
days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
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TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator-Jurisdictional hearing 
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the administrator under 
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator may attempt to settle the grievance 
informally by conference, conciliation, and persuasion with the employee and the agency. 
(2)(a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under the authority of 
Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine: 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is entitled to use the grievance 
system; 
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; 
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the administrator may: 
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present oral arguments, written arguments, 
or both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file. 
(3)(a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional hearing, he shall issue his written decision 
within 15 days after the hearing is adjourned. 
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an administrative review of the file, he shall issue his 
written decision within 15 days after he receives the grievance. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-404. Administrator's responsibilities. 
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets the jurisdictional requirements of 
Part 3, he shall: 
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and 
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(2) set a date for the hearing that is either: 
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues his decision that the board 
has jurisdiction over the grievance; or 
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the administrator. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-405. Prehearing conference. 
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each party, the representatives of each party, 
and other designated persons at a prehearing conference. 
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require the parties to: 
(a) identify which allegations are admitted and which allegations are denied; 
(b) submit a joint statement detailing: 
(ii) stipulated facts that are not in dispute; 
(ii) the issues to be decided; and 
(iii) applicable laws and rules; 
(c) submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and papers or other evidence that each party 
intends to offer as evidence; and 
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance. 
(3) At the conclusion of the prehearing conference, the administrator may require the parties to 
prepare a written statement identifying: 
(a) the items presented or agreed to under Subsection (s); and 
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearing process. 
(4) The prehearing conference is informal and is not open to the public or press. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved employee-Hearing before hearing 
officer-Evidentiary and procedural rules 
(l)(a) The administrator shall employ a certified court reporter to record the hearing and 
prepare an official transcript of the hearing. 
(b) The official transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits, briefs, motions, and pleadings 
received by the hearing officer are the official record of the proceeding. 
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(2)(a) The agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from dismissals, demotions, 
suspensions, written reprimands, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of 
position. 
(b) The employee has the burden of proof in all other grievances. 
(c) The party with the burden of proof must prove their case by substantial evidence. 
(3)(a) The hearing officer shall issue a written decision within 20 working days after the hearing 
is adjourned. 
(b) If the hearing officer does not issue a decision within 20 working days, the agency that is a 
party to the grievance is not liable for any claimed back wages or benefits after the date the 
decision is due. 
(4) The hearing officer may: 
(a) not award attorneys1 fees or costs to either party; 
(b) close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, 
Open and Public Meetings; 
(c) seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evidence raises questions about an 
employee's character, professional competence, or physical or mental health; 
(d) grant continuances according to board rule; and 
(e) decide questions or disputes concerning standing in accordance with Section 67-19a-301. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board. 
(l)(a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to 
the board if: 
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administrator within ten working 
days after the receipt of the decision or the expiration of the period for decision, whichever is 
first; and 
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal established in Subsection (2). 
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(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of the hearing to the 
administrator. 
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the 
board only if the appealing party alleges that: 
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days after the hearing 
adjourned; 
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision; 
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an incorrect or arbitrary 
interpretation of the facts; or 
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erroneous conclusion of 
law. 
TITLE 67. STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
CHAPTER 19A. GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
PART 4. PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
§ 67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing-Evidentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) hold a hearing to review the hearing officer's decision not later than 30 days after it 
receives the official transcript and the briefs; 
(b) review the decision of the hearing officer by considering the official record of that 
hearing and the briefs of the parties; and 
(c) issue its written decision addressing the hearing officer's decision within 40 working 
days after the record for its proceeding is closed. 
(2) In addition to whatever other remedy the board grants, it may order that the employee be 
placed on the reappointment roster provided for by Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another 
agency. 
(3) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days after closing the 
record, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not liable for any claimed back wages or 
benefits after the date the decision is due. 
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party. 
(5) The board may close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 
52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings. 
(6) The board may seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evidence raises 
questions about an employee's character, professional competence, or physical or mental health. 
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R477. ADMINISTRATION. 
R477-1-1. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply throughout these rules unless otherwise indicated within the 
text of each rule. 
(32) Demotion: An action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary range or the 
movement of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or position having a lower 
salary range, which may include a reduction in salary. Administrative adjustments and 
reclassifications are not included in the definition of a demotion. 
(69) Job Identification Number: A unique number assigned to a job by DHRM. 
(70) Job Proficiency Rating: An average of the last three annual performance evaluation ratings 
used in reduction in force proceedings. 
(87) Position Description: A document that describes the detailed tasks performed, as well as 
the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other requirements of a specific position. 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
R477. ADMINISTRATION. 
R477-3-3. Assignment of Duties. 
Management may assign, modify, or remove any employee task or responsibility in order to 
accomplish reorganization, improve business practices or process, or for any other reason 
deemed appropriate by the department administration. 
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